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Operational Responses to 
Piracy—A First Principles 
Approach 
Mark Sloan* 
There is a widely held consensus that maritime piracy is 
best prevented by addressing its root causes, but this article 
builds on an assumption that operational responses will also 
continue to play a key role in disrupting the pirates’ business 
model on land and at sea. To consider those operational 
responses from first principles, it employs the risk management 
approach used in critical infrastructure protection to analyse the 
mission of the shipping industry, identify the critical assets, 
consider the threat, and assess the vulnerabilities of those 
critical assets. It uses these steps to identify the risk and the 
management action necessary to mitigate that risk, while also 
considering incident response, consequence management, and 
steps to restore mission success. This analysis highlights the 
relevance of operational responses to countering opportunity 
and means in particular, and highlights the fact that reducing 
opportunity is a shared responsibility between security forces 
and the shipping industry. 
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I.  Introduction 
A.  Developing an Operational Response Framework 
There seems to be little disagreement among academics and 
practitioners alike, that the best way to counter existing outbreaks of 
piracy, and to prevent future outbreaks, is to address the root causes, 
which inform the motive elements of individual crimes. Furthermore, 
this consensus also points to the fact that solutions to the root causes 
generally, but not exclusively, lie in the socioeconomic sphere. 
Nevertheless, whatever the stage at which the problem is identified 
and countered, discouraging, deterring, disrupting, or defeating piracy 
requires enforcement of the rule of law on land and at sea, and the 
application of appropriate operational responses.1 Moreover, to be 
successful, such responses must be coordinated with socioeconomic 
and other initiatives, and be accompanied by, and must support, the 
related legal and governance structures and processes that bound 
operational responses.  
The continued need for operational responses provides the 
underlying assumption for this article. Moving forward from the 
assumption, the issue becomes identification of a suitable framework 
for the development of the appropriate operational responses, 
responses that must be tailored to the specifics of an actual or 
potential outbreak of piracy. Working from first principles in this 
process is essential in order to avoid the risk of deciding on the 
solution before the true nature of the problem has been defined. This 
brief analysis uses a risk management methodology to support this 
first principles approach, the model selected being that used in critical 
infrastructure protection. But why choose critical infrastructure 
protection as the framework, when shipping itself is not generally 
considered to be critical infrastructure? Even the concept of Maritime 
Global Critical Infrastructure focuses on key choke points and 
international maritime hubs, rather than on shipping itself.2 The 
 
1. See M. SLOAN & D. GRIFFITHS, DALHOUSIE MARINE PIRACY PROJECT: 
OPERATIONAL RESPONSES FOR THE DISCOURAGEMENT AND SUPPRESSION 
OF MARINE PIRACY (MARINE AFFAIRS PROGRAM TECHNICAL REPORT #3) 
17 (2012), available at http://marineaffairsprogram.dal.ca/Publications 
(defining operational responses as those actions taken to counter a 
potential or actual outbreak of piracy that are neither targeted at the 
root causes of piracy, nor address the related legal and governance 
issues). 
2. See RISK GOVERNANCE COUNCIL, RISK GOVERNANCE OF MARITIME 
INTERNATIONAL GLOBAL CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE: THE EXAMPLE OF 
THE STRAITS OF MALACCA AND SINGAPORE 9, 12 (2011), available at 
http://www.irgc.org/IMG/pdf/irgc_mgcireport_2011.pdf (considering 
the Straits of Malacca and Singapore as Maritime Global Critical 
Infrastructure because they are two of the most strategic chokepoints for 
world oil transport).  
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challenge here is not to argue whether shipping should be considered 
critical infrastructure, but rather to use the principles of critical 
infrastructure protection as a means of drawing out some of the key 
aspects associated with the identification and application of 
operational responses to piracy.  
B.  Definitions and Assumptions 
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to clarify the definition 
of piracy, as it is used in this article, and to set out the principles of 
critical infrastructure protection. In a recent study conducted at 
Dalhousie University,3 it was proposed that the definition of piracy 
should include acts committed both inside and outside territorial 
waters. This proposal was based on three considerations. First, the 
broader definition allows the identification of potential low-level 
precursors to larger outbreaks of piracy. These precursors often occur 
inside territorial waters, and such attacks are equally threatening to 
commercial shipping, fishing vessels, and private marine craft as 
attacks conducted on the high seas. Second, in order to make 
appropriate recommendations for operational and other responses, the 
full extent of attacks must be recorded. And, third, this definition 
helps the development of a holistic maritime security strategy, 
whether nationally, regionally, or internationally, since piracy is but 
one of a number of challenges to maritime security. The Dalhousie 
study also recommended that robbery (armed or unarmed) from ships 
that are berthed alongside in a port should be excluded from the 
definition because dealing with such incidents should be a routine 
national policing issue.4 The Dalhousie study’s definition of piracy 
therefore falls between that of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS)’s definition of piracy as acts on the high seas,5 and 
the “piracy and armed robbery” definition established by the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) and used by the 
International Maritime Bureau (IMB).6 For these reasons, this 
analysis uses the revised definition of piracy:  
 
3. See L. FANNING, M. SLOAN, S. WHITMAN, H. WILLIAMSON, & S. DOUGLAS, 
DALHOUSIE MARINE PIRACY PROJECT: EXPLORING AN INTEGRATED 
APPROACH TO THE SUPPRESSION AND PREVENTION OF MARINE PIRACY 
(MARINE AFFAIRS PROGRAM TECHNICAL REPORT #4) (2012) [hereinafter 
INTEGRATED APPROACH]. Details of the Dalhousie Marine Piracy Project 
are available at http://dmpp.management.dal.ca/.  
4. Id. at 15. 
5. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 101, opened for signature 
Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) 
(defining piracy as “any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act 
of depredation, committed for privates ends . . . on the high seas . . .”).  
6. Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Code of Practice for the Investigation of 
Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, Annex ¶¶ 2.1, 2.2, 
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The participation, planning and support of attempted or actual 
deliberate (violent) criminal interference with the rights and 
freedoms of the seas, which target marine craft (vessels) and 
persons for personal economic gain.7 
The Dalhousie study also made the assumption that piracy will never 
be eradicated completely, even though it may cease to be a 
meaningful risk in a particular region. That assumption remains valid 
in this analysis as well. 
The principles of critical infrastructure protection are simple. One 
must start by analyzing the mission; then identify the critical assets; 
consider the threat; assess the vulnerabilities of the critical assets; use 
these steps to identify the risk; and then take management action to 
mitigate that risk while also planning incident response, consequence 
management, and steps to restore mission success.  
II.  Mission and Critical Asset Analysis 
When applying this approach to the problem of countering marine 
piracy, defining the mission of seafarers and their vessels is relatively 
straightforward.8 Simplistically, this includes the safe, timely and 
legally compliant passage of the designated cargo, passengers, and 
crew from their place of loading to the required point of offload. Also 
quite simply, the critical assets under consideration are the vessels, 
their crews, passengers, and cargos. Given this mission and critical 
assets, it immediately becomes apparent from the critical 
infrastructure protection framework that the risk of a successful pirate 
attack will be minimized by one or both acts of reducing the threat or 
the reducing the vulnerability of the critical assets. 
III.  Threat Analysis 
In order for efforts to reduce the threat of piracy to be effective, 
threats must first be recognised and then understood. Although its 
general nature is encapsulated in the definition of piracy, the detail is 
more complex, and not only varies from one piracy area to another, 
but also changes. The different business models used by pirates in the 
Indian Ocean and in the Gulf of Guinea, and their evolution over 
time, are a clear illustration of these variations.  
However, recognising a threat and understanding it are two 
separate challenges. In an ideal world, the early, localised, 
 
IMO Assemb. Res. A. 1025 (26) (Dec. 2, 2009) (covering both the 
UNCLOS definition of piracy as well as “armed robbery at sea”).  
7. INTEGRATED APPROACH, supra note 3, at 6. 
8. Vessels refer to privately owned leisure as well as commercial vessels of 
all types. 
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opportunistic, subsistence type precursors to a significant outbreak of 
piracy will be reported and recognised for what they are, with actions 
then being taken to curb the crime before it takes on a more 
organised and challenging form. The theory is simple, but there are a 
number of reasons why nations may be unable or reluctant to 
acknowledge that they have a piracy problem. To start with, in the 
absence of an effective incident reporting and recording process, they 
may fail to recognise the threat. Even if such a problem is recognized, 
it may not be acknowledged for several reasons, including the 
perceived impact on a country’s international standing and on the 
willingness of vessels to use its waters and ports when faced with such 
a threat, or the lack of national laws recognising the crime of piracy. 
Nevertheless, early identification of a potential piracy problem is 
essential for the development of appropriate operational responses.  
In the case of the Somali piracy outbreak, many Somalis claimed 
that the early piracy attacks were a response to their need to counter 
illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in their waters.9 If this 
concern had been recognised earlier, and if steps were taken by the 
regional and international community to address the problem in the 
absence of any effective government in Somalia, it would have 
removed the claim of legitimacy for the pirates’ actions. Additionally, 
such efforts may have prevented or slowed the development of the 
much wider threat. 
Understanding the pirates’ business model, and therefore the 
threat, is as complex now as historically. However, amidst these 
complexities, there has been a constant in the piracy formula—it 
occurs where motive, means, and opportunity combine to the extent 
that the potential financial gains outweigh the risk and fear of arrest, 
injury, or death. Without a motive, means to conduct the crime will 
not be sought, and opportunities will not be exploited. Each of these 
three factors is shaped by the context of the particular region and 
leads to the development of differences in the business models. Motive 
may be as simple as greed, or as complex as gang or tribal 
loyalties/rivalries, revenge, and social retribution. Opportunity arises 
from a flawed maritime security environment, weak rule of law on 
land, and the availability and vulnerability of potential targets. 
Means include the availability of the organisation, finances, material, 
 
9. See, e.g., Tristan McConnell, Somali Pirates’ Rise Linked to Illegal 
Fishing and Toxic Dumping, GLOBAL POST (Mar. 16, 2012), 
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/africa/120306/pirate
s-Somalia-how-it-started%20 (stating how illegal fishing, which costs the 
Somali economy hundreds of millions of dollars, gave rise to piracy); 
U.N. Secretary General, Rep. of the Secretary-General on the Protection 
of Somali Natural Resources and Waters, ¶ 44, U.N. Doc. S/2011/661 
(Oct. 25, 2011) (discussing how the piracy surge has led to a decrease in 
illegal fishing on the Somali coast).  
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information, and personnel necessary to support the activity. As with 
any form of crime, countering any or all of this trinity will render the 
piracy business model unsustainable, thereby reducing or negating the 
threat, and the risk.  
A.  Motive 
Comparing modern with historic outbreaks of piracy, motive is 
perhaps the least changed of the factors. However, it is not 
unreasonable to suggest that, as the gap between rich and poor has 
become more transparent to those at the poor end of the spectrum, 
the growing awareness of their plight has created increased motive to 
address the imbalance. While socioeconomic solutions are at the heart 
of countering motive, and thereby reducing the threat, operational 
responses also have a role—for example, when the rule of law is used 
to deal with tribal loyalties or rivalries, revenge or social retribution.10 
In contrast, addressing opportunity and means are heavily dependent 
on operational responses. 
B. Opportunity 
Opportunity for pirates arises when effective rule of law is weak 
or absent, thus allowing them to operate with relative impunity. 
Additionally, it stems from vulnerabilities among potential targets. 
Ineffective rule of law where piracy is concerned therefore includes 
both a flawed maritime security environment and weak rule of law on 
land. Overcoming this requires political will and, in the case of 
maritime security, recognition of the importance of the territorial 
waters and adjacent high seas to the state’s security and economy. 
Even in July 2011, the Commander of the Benin Naval Training 
Center stated that “[c]ountries like mine do not realize what they are 
losing at sea by not conducting security.”11 An associated and equally 
important need exists for states to enact national legislation 
establishing piracy as a crime, and therefore providing the legal 
foundation for practical counter-piracy actions and subsequent 
prosecutions.  
If piracy emanates from more unstable or less developed nations 
or regions, capacity building may be required in order to develop a 
state’s ability to enforce the rule of law. In the context of piracy and 
other organised crime, it is important that such capacity building is 
 
10. See Brett D. Schaefer, Piracy: A Symptom of Somalia’s Deeper 
Problems, HERITAGE FOUND. (Apr. 17, 2009) (noting how tribal factions 
in Somalia have deprived the state of proper governance and legitimacy, 
thereby creating a climate ripe for piracy). 
11. Seminar Focuses on Maritime Safety and Security in West and Central 
Africa, AFR. CTR. FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES (July 25, 2011), 
http://africacenter.org/2011/07/seminar-focuses-on-maritime-safety-
and-security-in-west-and-central-africa/. 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 46·2013 
Operational Responses to Piracy—A First Principles Approach 
381 
not just focused on national development, but also considers the 
regional and international security dimension in order to improve 
interoperability, situational awareness, and situational understanding 
between agencies and nations. The need for such an approach in the 
Gulf of Guinea has been recognized by the European Commission,12 
among others, and was also the driver behind the formation of the 
Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed 
Robbery Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP).13 The European Union led 
project “Critical Maritime Routes in the Gulf of Guinea Programme 
(CRIMGO)” focuses on training for coastguards and establishing a 
network to share information between countries and agencies.14 That 
is not to say that the approach has to be complex, and progress made 
developing information sharing centres under the Djibouti Code of 
Conduct,15 for example, is clear evidence of what can be achieved 
relatively simply.  
In terms of the availability of potential targets, there are certainly 
more now than historically because of the greater number of ships and 
tonnage of cargo moved by sea, the number of ports in operation, and 
the increase in the number of leisure craft. According to figures 
compiled by Clarksons, a shipping information provider,16 the world’s 
fleet of commercial vessels over 100 tons numbered 86,300 ships at the 
end of 2012, and in 2013 there were 57,400 ships actually carrying 
cargo. However, it is not the availability of potential targets that 
 
12. CRISTINA BARRIOS, EU INST. FOR SECURITY STUDIES, FIGHTING PIRACY 
IN THE GULF OF GUINEA OFFSHORE AND ONSHORE 3 (2013), available at 
http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_20.pdf (describing the 
European Commission’s initiatives in the Gulf of Guinea that are 
focused on maritime security, surveillance, and information sharing). 
13. Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed 
Robbery Against Ships in Asia, Nov. 11, 2004, 2398 U.N.T.S. 199 
(entered into force Sept. 4, 2006). 
14. Press Release, European Commission, New EU Initiative to Combat 
Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea (Jan. 10, 2013), available at http://europa. 
eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-14_en.htm. 
15. See Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Code of Conduct Concerning the 
Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in the Western 
Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, Djibouti Meeting Res. 1 (Jan. 29, 
2009), available at http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/PIU/ 
Documents/DCoC%20English.pdf; Loukas Kontogiannis, Info Sharing 
& Maritime Situational Awareness: Status of Implementation Efforts 
& Future Plans, INT’L MAR. ORG., http://ipsc.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ 
fileadmin/repository/mare/vescosur/pmar_wks/IMO_presentation.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 27, 2014). 
16. Too Many Ships in the World Merchant Fleet, HELLENIC SHIPPING NEWS 
(Apr. 8, 2013), http://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/News.aspx? 
ElementId=984ef639-7f94-4d62-88a9-f80b3ecc6fb9. 
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contributes to opportunity so much as their vulnerability, hence the 
importance of considering the vulnerability analysis.  
C.  Means 
The final threat driver is means, and the analysis of means and 
ways to counter them have been significantly advanced by recognition 
of the fact that piracy in all but its subsistence form employs a 
business model. Previous efforts to end piracy outbreaks have put 
great emphasis on actions taken at sea, thereby operating to suppress 
criminal acts that are often simply symptoms of a greater problem on 
land. In contrast, looking at piracy from the perspective of the 
business model highlights the fact that its support functions are 
generally based on land. This helps in the identification of those parts 
of the model that are most vulnerable, or the disruption of which will 
have most effect on the operation of that model. However, as was the 
case in Somalia, for example, and to an extent the way it remains so 
today, the lack of a secure environment on land meant that actions at 
sea were almost all that was possible until conditions ashore 
improved. Actions at sea should therefore not be discounted as an 
option.  
Disruption to the business model may be short term, thereby 
allowing more permanent measures to be put in place in order to 
counter any or all of opportunity, motive, and means. Alternatively, 
disruption may be a longer-term solution in itself if it disrupts the 
model to the extent that it cannot evolve, thereby impacting the 
ability to conduct piracy at all. Different agencies will focus on 
different parts of the model, and working to counter the business 
model therefore emphasises the essential need for a truly inter-agency 
approach. Achieving such a coordinated inter-agency approach is 
another area where capacity building has a role to play, as recognized 
by the IMO’s current work with the Gulf of Guinea nations.17 The 
fact that many of these and other points raised have parallels with 
lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan emphasizes the need to 
identify and learn lessons from efforts to counter other forms of 
organized crime. The specific nature of these crimes may differ, but 
similarities between the business models provide good opportunities to 
transfer lessons learned from one “campaign” to another.  
One element of the means factor that does not receive much 
attention is the availability of information. As with almost all walks 
of life, the plethora of widely available open source information has 
brought a new dimension to organized crime, including piracy, and 
 
17. IMO Strategy for Implementing Sustainable Maritime Security Measures 
in West and Central Africa, INT’L MAR. ORG. (Mar. 18, 2014), 
http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/WestAfrica/Pages/WestAfrica.
aspx (describing a Code of Conduct for West African states to promote 
regional cooperation in the fight against piracy). 
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this is reflected in the pirates’ knowledge of shipping movements and 
of the measures being taken to counter their attacks. For example, if 
the European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) deployed to the 
Indian Ocean changes its posture, or if it experiences a reduction in 
the number of assets allocated by contributing nations, the pirates 
will learn of these changes through the media and other sources very 
quickly. As another example, access to Automatic Identification 
System (AIS) tracking is easy to achieve.18 With this access, a 
plethora of information about shipping movements is readily 
available, as is information that can be used to identify potential 
victims. It is too late to turn off the “information tap,” but an 
awareness of what can be learned from open source information, and 
reducing some information availability, is another way in which 
vulnerability can, and is being reduced. 
IV.  Vulnerability Analysis 
Government security forces such as naval and coastguard units, as 
well as police and security forces on land, have a significant role to 
play in reducing vulnerability of the critical assets. So too does the 
willingness of the shipping companies, owners, operators, and 
charterers of vessels to implement appropriate ship protection 
measures. The importance of the latter has been widely debated in 
recent years, particularly with respect to the need and desirability of 
embarking armed security guards, whether Privately Contracted 
Armed Security Personnel (PCASP) or the Vessel Protection 
Detachments (VPDs) provided from armed forces personnel. Despite 
the ebbs and flows of this particular debate, shipping industry 
recognition of their role in reducing vulnerability has been reflected in 
the development of Best Management Practices19 for use in the Indian 
Ocean. More recently Interim Guidelines for Owners, Operators, and 
Masters for protection against piracy in the Gulf of Guinea region20 
were produced at the end of 2012.  
 
18. See AIS Transponders, INT’L MAR. ORG., http://www.imo.org/ 
OurWork/Safety/Navigation/Pages/AIS.aspx (last visited Mar. 25, 
2014) (stating how the AIS is designed to automatically provide ships 
with information). 
19. BMP 4: BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES FOR PROTECTION AGAINST 
SOMALI BASED PIRACY (2011), available at http://www.mschoa.org/ 
docs/public-documents/bmp4_low_res_sep_ 5_2011.pdf. 
20. INTERIM GUIDELINES FOR OWNERS, OPERATORS AND MASTERS FOR 
PROTECTION AGAINST PIRACY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA REGION 2 (2012), 
available at https://www.bimco.org/en/News/2012/12/%7E/media/ 
Security/Piracy/Gulf_of_Guinea/2012-12-20_RT_agreed_GoG_anti-
piracy_guidance.ashx (stating that “these interim Guidelines aim to 
bridge the gap between the advice currently found in BMP4 and the 
prevailing situation in the Gulf of Guinea region”).  
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The classic vulnerable vessel has a low freeboard, and travels 
slowly. A study in 201121 identified that the average speed of the ships 
seized in the Indian Ocean was 13 knots, while the average freeboard 
was only 4.5 metres. That study also stated that there had been no 
successful attacks reported on vessels with a service speed of more 
than 18 knots and with more than 8 metres freeboard.22 Conversely, 
this indicates that reducing transit speeds in order to save fuel will 
increase certain vessels’ vulnerability to attack if a piracy threat is 
present. It also means that some vessels should simply not be at sea 
in the threat area. This might be a difficult case to make economically 
when the actual risk of being attacked is low (and in the Indian 
Ocean, even at the height of the piracy threat, it was less than 1 
percent),23 but if economics are not a factor, it is a very effective way 
of reducing vulnerability.  
Measures to reduce vulnerability are therefore at the core of 
preventing successful attacks, and they should be mandatory rather 
than discretionary when the threat level dictates such measures to be 
appropriate. The fact that there are already legal mechanisms in place 
that require vulnerabilities to be reduced, and also mandate 
monitoring the extent to which those requirements are being met, is 
sometimes overlooked or ignored because compliance is inconvenient. 
Key among such mechanisms is the International Ship and Port 
Facility Security Code, under which ships are expected to identify 
critical areas and to conduct a ship security assessment.24 However, 
differing interpretations of this code have led to a lack of clear 
direction, which has been interpreted by some states as allowing an 
administrative approach to security that tends to apply only when the 
ship is in port or well inside territorial waters. Even though flag state 
responsibilities are established in UNCLOS and subsequent additional 
guidance and legislation, there is still more work to be done to ensure 
that suitable, common standards are achieved, and to discourage the 
use of any flag that does not meet its international obligations.  
 
21. CATLIN ASSET PROTECTION, PIRACY 2011: A GROWING MENACE 8 (2011), 
available at http://www.catlin.com/en/UnitedKingdom/Insurance/War-
Political-Risk/~/media/Downloads/UK/Thought%20leadership/Catlin-
report-Piracy-a-growing-menace.ashx.  
22. Id.  
23. Horn of Africa Piracy Activity Update – 8 Jul, OCEANUSLIVE (July 8, 
2011), http://www.oceanuslive.org/main/viewnews.aspx?uid=00000286. 
24. Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Consideration and Adoption of the 
International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, ¶¶ 7.2, 8.5, 
IMO Conf. Doc. SOLAS/CONF.5/34 (Dec. 17, 2002), available at 
http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/transport/security/maritime/isps/files
/resolutions_2_9.pdf (outlining the necessary elements of a ship 
security assessment).  
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Despite the important role of the Port State Control Regime,25 
various studies have indicated shortcomings in its effectiveness in 
some parts of the world. Although seldom commented on in relation 
to countering piracy, the regime has a role to play in reducing the 
number of ships at sea with key vulnerabilities, and therefore, 
deserves continued attention. 
Armed with an understanding of the specific nature of the threat 
in an area, and the vulnerabilities of any particular vessel, it is 
therefore relatively simple to assess the degree of risk. Once that is 
complete, it is possible to identify appropriate mitigating action, 
whether that action is required by or for specific vessels in build or 
already in operation, or nationally, regionally or internationally by a 
range of agencies. 
V.  Incident Response, Consequence Management, and 
Restoration of Mission Success 
In addition to providing a framework to support identification of 
the levels of threat, vulnerability, and risk, the critical infrastructure 
protection process also requires consideration of incident response, 
consequence management, and restoration of mission success. As with 
much of what has already been discussed, this will require a multi-
agency approach and a range of actions, some of which include the 
need for operational responses. Actions to free pirated ships and 
hostages, or to pay ransoms, are the obvious examples, but others, 
such as dealing with an environmental disaster (e.g., a major oil spill 
or a collision at sea), are also likely, and will require an operational 
response. Each situation will require a well exercised response if their 
impact is to be contained. The environmental issue is perhaps 
particularly relevant in the current piracy outbreak in the Gulf of 
Guinea, where the business model commonly involves the hijack of a 
 
25. Port State Control is the inspection of foreign ships in national ports to 
verify that the condition of the ship and its equipment comply with the 
requirements of international regulations and that the ship is manned 
and operated in compliance with these rules. IMO has encouraged the 
establishment of regional Port State Control organizations and 
agreements on Port State Control. Memoranda of Understanding 
(MoUs) have been signed covering all of the world’s oceans: Europe and 
the North Atlantic (Paris MoU); Asia and the Pacific (Tokyo MoU); 
Latin America (Acuerdo de Viña del Mar); Caribbean (Caribbean 
MoU); West and Central Africa (Abuja MoU); the Black Sea region 
(Black Sea MoU); the Mediterranean (Mediterranean MoU); the Indian 
Ocean (Indian Ocean MoU); and the Riyadh MoU. See Port State 
Control, INT’L MAR. ORG., http://www.imo.org/blast/mainframe.asp? 
topic_id=159 (last visited Mar. 26, 2014). 
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tanker, followed by transhipment of its cargo to another vessel for 
subsequent resale.26 
Underpinning all of this effort is the need for an effective incident 
reporting process. All of the agencies who maintain statistics about 
piracy attacks openly acknowledge that they are only showing what is 
reported, and that a significant number of attacks are not reported, 
and thus absent from the databases. Part of the challenge is certainly 
an unwillingness to report incidents, but another aspect is the 
multiplicity of reporting channels. As one analyst noted, “[i]t seems 
clear that the problem is both simple, in that we need to effectively 
capture data on pirates, but at the same time it is exquisitely 
complex, in so far as shipowners don’t want to report, security 
companies are accused of scaremongering if they do report, and the 
agencies charged with collecting and collating, aren’t sure what they 
are meant to be gathering, for whom and for what purpose.”27 If 
formal reporting mechanisms are not capturing all piracy incidents in 
a region, measures should be implemented that will improve the ease 
of access to a reporting hub for those making the report, encourage 
incidents to be reported (by changing the culture), and establish 
national and/or regional reporting systems that combine in a seamless 
manner. Only then will counter-piracy activities be targeted to best 
effect, and a more complete record of piracy activity identifying the 
true extent of the problem be established.  
VI. Conclusion 
In conclusion, this brief analysis uses the critical infrastructure 
protection framework to illustrate how a systematic risk management 
approach works from first principles to help develop the operational 
responses to piracy, and to plan for incident response and restoration 
of mission success. It also provides a framework against which the 
various options might be validated, and it aids development of an 
understanding of the wider cross-domain issues associated with 
countering the problem. This includes furthering the coordinated 
inter-agency, stakeholder-wide approach that is essential to effectively 
counter piracy, whether preemptively or reactively. 
 
26. See Freedom C. Onuoha, Oil Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, CONFLICT 
TRENDS 28, 31 (2012) (explaining the modus operandi of pirates in the 
Gulf of Guinea).  
27. Doesn’t Add Up: A Look at the Real Facts Behind the Drop in Piracy 
Attacks in the Indian Ocean, INS. BULL. (SEACURUS Ltd., Gateshead, 
U.K.), Apr. 2013, at 11 www.seacurus.com/newsletter/Seacurus_Issue_ 
24.pdf.  
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